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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

24 NOVEMBER 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 47)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 NOVEMBER 1971

Moscow (2672 items)

China	(4%)	5%
Indochina	(4%)	5%
Chilean CP-CPSU	(2%)	3%
Talks in Moscow		
Somali President	(--)	3%
Barre in USSR		
Middle East	(1%)	3%
Brezhnev in France	(3%)	3%
October Revolution Anniversary	(25%)	2%
Rocket Troops & Artillery Day	(--)	2%

Peking (1190 items)

United Nations	(8%)	28%
[PRC Delegation Welcomed	(--)	9%]
[Delegates Speeches	(--)	8%]
[Chiao Kuan-hua's 15 November Speech	(--)	7%]
Indochina	(21%)	20%
[Pham Van Dong in PRC	(--)	11%]
Domestic Issues	(24%)	18%
Asia-Africa Table Tennis Tournament	(13%)	15%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

The visit to Peking of a DRV party-government delegation under Premier Pham Van Dong has occasioned a major demonstration of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and Chinese assurances of continuing support for Hanoi. The North Vietnamese have used the visit, which began on 20 November, to spell out hardened negotiating terms for a Vietnam settlement, in effect signaling to ally and adversary alike that Hanoi is firm in its demands whatever developments big-power summitry next year may bring. The Chinese, with an eye to reassuring their allies regarding the effects of President Nixon's visit, have dramatized their commitment by declaring that failure to support the Vietnamese against the United States would be a betrayal of internationalism. Chou En-lai took the occasion to ascribe priority to the Indochina conflict as posing the most urgent questions demanding settlement today.

In his first speech in Peking, Pham Van Dong formulated a tough line on political settlement which elaborated on the PRG's seven-point proposal to demand cessation of all U.S. military activity in both parts of Vietnam and an end of all support and commitments to the Thieu government. Carrying forward other recent DRV elaborations of the PRG proposal, most notably in statements during the North Korean party-government delegation's Hanoi visit in late October, Dong's reformulation of the communist negotiating position is the most authoritative and most categorical to date.

In his speeches in Peking Dong caustically attacked President Nixon's 12 November statement on the further withdrawal of U.S. forces, and the President's statement was also the focus of attacks by the communist delegates at the Paris talks on 18 November.

## PHAM VAN DONG LEADS PARTY-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO PRC

A DRV party-government delegation headed by Premier Pham Van Dong arrived in Peking on 20 November for "an official friendly visit" at the invitation of the Chinese party and government, the first such visit since Dong's October 1969 trip to Peking and Moscow.\*

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\* Dong's 1969 trip following Ho Chi Minh's death came during a period when Hanoi was seeking to promote Sino-Soviet harmony and when Moscow and Peking agreed to open talks on their border dispute.

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The current trip, which returns Chou En-lai's visit to the DRV last March, comes against the background of Hanoi's show of disquiet over Peking's invitation to President Nixon as well as in the wake of the recent leadership reshuffle in the PRC. The visit was given only one day's advance public notice.

A massive welcome accorded the visitors was accompanied by a turnout of all the Chinese leaders now making appearances and was highlighted by a talk with Mao on the 22d in what NCNA called "a most cordial and friendly atmosphere." Activities thus far have included a welcoming banquet on the 20th and a Peking rally on the 23d, both addressed by Dong and Chou. The composition of the two sides' delegations at talks on the 21st and 23d suggest that further economic and military aid may have been discussed. Both groups included officials responsible for foreign affairs, defense, and foreign trade and aid. The Chinese taking part in the substantive talks have been headed by Chou; by Yeh Chien-ying, vice chairman of the party's Military Affairs Commission and a member of Chou's delegation last March; and by Li Hsien-nien, who headed the Chinese economic delegation which concluded the annual aid agreement in September, the first time the accord had been signed in Hanoi rather than Peking.

In addition to Sino-Vietnamese solidarity, an accompanying theme of Indochinese unity and Peking's solidarity with the Indochinese was served by the presence at ceremonies of Cambodian and Laotian representatives. The Cambodians included Prince Sihanouk and Ieng Sary, the new prominent "special envoy" from the frontlines who had himself just returned to Peking on the 20th from a visit to the DRV as head of a delegation of Sihanouk's front and government.\*

CHINESE SUPPORT      In a setting in which the North Vietnamese would be expected to sound out Peking on the implications of President Nixon's forthcoming visit and to assess the effects of the Chinese leadership changes, the two sides have sought to project a meeting of the minds based on Hanoi's resolve to press its demands for a Vietnam settlement and Peking's assurances of unflagging support. In his first speech, at the banquet on the 20th, Dong pointedly recalled--in

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\* The Cambodian delegation's visit, which was marked by copious testimony to Indochinese unity, is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 November, pages 8-10.

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the context of an attack on the President's 12 November troop withdrawal announcement--that the joint communique on Chou's visit last March had dismissed the Nixon Administration's talk about peace and negotiations as "merely a smokescreen for war expansion." Dong then proceeded to define the hardened terms for a Vietnam settlement (discussed below).

The Chinese have sought to reassure Hanoi by reaffirming support for its negotiating position while pledging continuing support in the war effort. In his brief speech on the 20th, Chou made a point of ascribing priority to the Vietnam conflict among current international problems, a point attributed to him in foreign interviews but not previously reported in PRC media. In effect reassuring the North Vietnamese that Sino-U.S. relations will not take precedence over their cause, Chou stressed that "the Vietnam and Indochina questions are the most urgent questions demanding settlement in the world today." Repeating Peking's demand that the United States withdraw its troops from Indochina "speedily, totally, and unconditionally," Chou expressed PRC support for the PRG's seven-point proposal, Sihanouk's five-point declaration, and the NLHS' five-point plan. Chinese support for this package of proposals was first expressed in the joint communique on Chou's visit to the DRV last March and has been repeated periodically since.

Chou took the occasion of the rally on the 23d to assert Peking's commitments in forceful terms, making clear at the same time that a settlement in Indochina is a matter for the peoples in that region to decide for themselves. Again affirming support for the PRG's seven points and the other proposals, he declared emphatically, in an apostrophe to the Indochinese people, that "you, and you alone, are entitled to decide the affairs of your respective countries." In another passage he charged that the United States "completely tore up" the Geneva agreements in the course of its involvement in Vietnam. This formulation, which became standard in Peking comment after the war intensified in 1965, has reappeared occasionally in recent months.

At the rally Chou pledged Chinese readiness to undertake even "the greatest national sacrifices" in support of the Vietnamese, a formulation also dating back to 1965 and revived by Chou during his visit to Hanoi last March. This pledge was again voiced by Li Hsien-nien during his September visit. Chou added that "this firm stand of ours" is unshakable "no matter

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what happens in the world," an amplification that could be read as a reassurance to Hanoi in view of the impending Nixon visit.

**INTERNATIONALISM** Concern to allay Hanoi's apprehension over the presidential visit also seems reflected in another formulation used by Chou in his rally speech. After invoking the standard Maoist dictum regarding Chinese rear area support for the Vietnamese, Chou declared that failure to render this support would be "a betrayal of internationalism." Chou thus paraphrased a formula he had introduced during his Hanoi visit last March as a Mao instruction to the effect that "if anyone among us should say that we cannot help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, that means betrayal, betrayal of the revolution."

During the visit of the Chinese aid delegation in September, coming in the wake of Hanoi's withering polemics implying that Peking's invitation to President Nixon was an act of opportunism and a breach of proletarian internationalism, Li Hsien-nien asserted that if one failed to aid Vietnam "he is not a proletarian internationalist and not a communist; this will mean betrayal of the revolution." Chou's reformulation thus has the effect of further sharpening Chinese assurances that developments in Sino-U.S. relations will not take place at the expense of Peking's internationalist commitments to its allies.

It has been on the issue of proletarian internationalism that divergent Chinese and Vietnamese positions have been reflected in recent months, but Dong's visit has apparently resulted in a convergence of views. During Li's September visit to Hanoi the Vietnamese had failed to respond in kind to his assurances that Peking is committed to a policy based on proletarian internationalism, and there were other indications of Vietnamese misgivings on this score in the wake of the announcement of President Nixon's visit.\* This pattern was also reflected at the beginning of Dong's current visit, with the North Vietnamese maintaining some reserve in failing to match Chinese claims that Sino-Vietnamese relations are based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Rather than echoing Chou's assertion at the 20 November banquet that

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\* These indications are discussed in the TRENDS of 29 September, pages 4-5.

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relations already rest on this basis, Dong on the same occasion said the Vietnamese are resolved to "consolidate and develop the relations of friendship and cooperation between our two parties and our two peoples on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

In his speech at the rally on the 23d, however, Dong concluded with a paean to Sino-Vietnamese relations in which he stated that "our relations based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism have developed daily and become all the more unbreakable." Further, he took the occasion to express "deep and heartfelt thanks" to the Chinese for "their highly valuable support and assistance filled with noble proletarian internationalist sentiments."

**SOVIET ROLE** In the sole jab at the Soviets by the Chinese thus far during the visit, Chou on the 23d voiced Peking's line on the medium and small countries uniting against "the power politics practiced by the superpowers." Dong, on the other hand, made a point of linking China and Vietnam with "the entire powerful socialist camp."

But where Dong on the 20th had followed Hanoi's recent practice of singling out both the PRC and the Soviet Union in expressing gratitude for aid, his strong expression of gratitude for Chinese aid was not balanced by a bow to Moscow at the mass rally on the 23d.\*

#### POLITICAL SETTLEMENT: DONG HARDENS TERMS OF PRG PROPOSAL

Pham Van Dong's remarks on political settlement in his 20 November banquet speech carry forward the movement in recent weeks toward a more intransigent DRV position by further spelling out points which had previously been left deliberately vague. A decision to move in this direction had seemed reflected, though less sharply, in DRV statements at the end of October and may date back to late August, when Pham Van Dong in his National Day address expressed the judgment that "President Nixon does not want to talk seriously to settle the Vietnam question on the basis of the seven points . . . ."

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\* The only available Soviet acknowledgment of the visit is a brief, factual 22 November TASS report on the delegation's arrival and the welcoming banquet. TASS singled out Dong's reference to Soviet aid.

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By September Hanoi may have been convinced that the United States would not commit itself to a deadline for the withdrawal of all its forces and would continue to support Thieu under the Vietnamization program. Having concluded that Peking's invitation to President Nixon had undercut the impact of the 1 July initiative, Hanoi may have decided to move to a hardened negotiating position to insure its interests against the effects of big-power summitry. It is noteworthy that Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's article in the October HOC TAP, probably written in September, called for taking the initiative and stepping up the diplomatic struggle. Dong, in his 23 November Peking rally speech, seemed to reflect a similar opinion when he spoke of the potential "role of far-reaching significance" for the diplomatic struggle.

**ELABORATION OF 7 POINTS** Describing the seven-point initiative as "an offensive to drive the other side into a corner," Dong explained that the plan is "an integrated whole in which two particularly important points stand out." Detailing point one, he closely paraphrased the July proposal in saying that "the United States must completely stop its aggressive war in Vietnam, put a complete end to the 'Vietnamization' policy, withdraw totally and without condition all troops, military advisers and personnel, weapons and war materials of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam, and liquidate the U.S. military bases in South Vietnam." But he went on to say that the United States must "put an end to all military acts, in any form and from any place whatsoever, against the Vietnamese people in the two zones."

Foreign Minister Trinh's elaboration of the PRG proposal on 24 October, at a banquet honoring the visiting North Korean delegation, demanded an end to all U.S. air and naval activities. The joint communique signed at the close of that visit called for an end to all U.S. air and naval activities "in South Vietnam,"\* and subsequent propaganda echoed the communique's formulation. Dong's elaboration has now broadened "air and naval activities" to cover "all military acts in any form," with the phrase "from any place whatsoever" presumably encompassing planes, ships, and any other military equipment stationed, for example, in Thailand, Okinawa, and the Gulf of Tonkin; and it has broadened the locus to include both North and South Vietnam.

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\* See the 3 November TRENDS, pages 11-13.

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In addressing himself to point one of the proposal, Dong did not repeat the demand in Trinh's formulation for an end to "U.S. military aid to the puppet administration in Saigon." But in point two, which in the formal proposal called vaguely for an end to U.S. interference in South Vietnam's internal affairs and an end to U.S. support for the Thieu administration, Dong added that the United States must "relinquish all its commitments" to the Saigon administration, a demand which could encompass economic as well as military aid.

Dong pointed up the question of use of aid by the United States to continue the war after troop withdrawal when he emphasized the interrelationship between points one and two: "These two points of very essential significance are closely interrelated in the sense that the U.S. scheme of Vietnamization means to withdraw U.S. troops but still continue the U.S. war of aggression with the puppet troops under the U.S. command and with very strong U.S. aid in particular. Therefore, only should the U.S. withdraw the totality of U.S. troops and at the same time cease the maintenance of the Nguyen Van Thieu puppet administration . . . could the war be settled and peace restored in Vietnam."

Dong's remarks included no reference to a U.S. troop withdrawal deadline or the prisoner-of-war issue. He concluded his discussion of a political settlement by stating that if the United States "really wants to reach a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, it must respond to the seven points at the Paris talks."

Dong's stress on the interrelationship between points one and two, while at the same time toughening the demand for cessation of American support to Saigon, represents a notable departure from Hanoi's practice of obscuring the relationships between the key military and political provisions of the PRG plan and sidestepping U.S. demands for clarification. There was never any acknowledgment in Vietnamese communist media of Le Duc Tho's remarks in his interview with the New York TIMES' Anthony Lewis on 6 July regarding the question of settling points one and two separately. At that time, Tho reportedly took the flexible position that point one could be settled separately "to show our goodwill." In reply to a question on whether the United States could provide military and economic assistance to South Vietnam after withdrawal, Tho said that after a "total" withdrawal, other questions would be discussed.

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Hanoi media also failed to report remarks on the relationship of points one and two by Xuan Thuy at the 16 September Paris session which suggested the tougher position Hanoi has subsequently assumed. In response to a call by Ambassador Porter for a clarification of the PRG proposal, Thuy asked the U.S. delegate whether the United States is willing to announce a troop withdrawal and an end to the "maintenance" of the Thieu regime "at the same time."

ATTACK ON           It may have been by design that Pham Van Dong's  
PRESIDENT           definition of the hardened communist stand on  
                     political settlement was timed after President  
Nixon had made his 12 November announcement on further troop  
withdrawals. Dong scored the President's statement in his  
speeches both on the 20th and the 23d, holding that the  
President's "roundabout and embarrassed statements prove that  
the 'Vietnamization' of the war will surely become bankrupt"  
and "distinctly prove the bellicose, obdurate, and perfidious  
nature of the U.S. imperialist aggressors." Charging that  
"the U.S. pirates" aim at "maintaining perpetually U.S.  
occupation troops and the Saigon puppet administration and  
carrying out neocolonialism in South Vietnam," Dong asserted  
on the 20th that these "dark designs" were being exposed  
by U.S. and world public opinion and had been laid bare in the  
joint communique at the time of Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi  
last March.

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## PRESIDENT'S TROOP WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT SCORED BY DRV, PRG

In addition to Pham Van Dong's criticism of President Nixon's 12 November troop withdrawal announcement, attacks on the announcement were made at the 18 November Paris session and in commentaries broadcast by Liberation Radio--two on the 17th and one on the 18th.

At Paris, PRG deputy head Nguyen Van Tien--again substituting for Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, who has not attended a session since 12 August--echoed earlier comment\* in claiming that the announcement demonstrated the President's intention to continue the war, accusing him of trying to "elude" a withdrawal deadline by "ballyhooing about an 'increased troop withdrawal.'" DRV delegate head Xuan Thuy--returning from a month's "rest" in the GDR--also scored the President for refusing to set a troop withdrawal deadline, as well as for "only" declaring a withdrawal of 45,000 men. The fact that U.S. forces will be down to 140,000 by 1 February 1972 has not been acknowledged specifically in any of the Vietnamese communist comment except for the initial Liberation Radio commentary of 17 November. Tien obscured the point by charging that there will still be nearly 200,000 U.S. and allied forces in South Vietnam, "not including tens of thousands . . . in the Seventh Fleet and at U.S. bases in Thailand who directly take part in the Vietnam war."

Both Tien and Thuy took exception to the factors the President said would determine future withdrawals--the level of enemy activity, progress in Vietnamization, and progress in the release of POW's and a cease-fire. Previously, in outlining the third factor, only the NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 15th had noted--without comment--that the President spoke of progress toward a cease-fire as well as on the POW issue. Tien and Thuy at Paris addressed all three factors in some detail, although VNA's account reports Thuy's comment only in general terms, noting that he scored the President for proposing "many" conditions for future withdrawals; the account does not include Thuy's statement that the prisoner issue is a question of the aftermath of the war and that the PRG's seven-point solution takes care of the cease-fire question. But VNA's account specifically quotes the PRG's Tien as stating, in the course of his "severe"

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\* See the 17 November TRENDS, pages 1-4.

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criticism of the President's three factors, that the Vietnamese people's stand on both the POW and cease-fire issues is contained in the seven-point solution.

As in the earlier comment, both delegates failed to mention that the factor of the level of enemy activity includes heightened levels of infiltration into South Vietnam. Both ridiculed the notion that the Vietnamese people will "give up their fight." VNA reports Tien as saying that the fact that the President is waiting for progress in Vietnamization "refutes the boasts of the U.S. Defense Secretary about the 'astounding progress' of that program."

Although both communist delegates denounced the President's "threat" to continue or even step up air strikes, VNA reports only Thuy's remarks. Neither delegate, of course, acknowledged that the subject was raised in the context of heightened communist infiltration into South Vietnam. Noting recent "massive bombing" throughout Indochina since Secretary Laird's early-November visit, Thuy said the President's statements and the current bombing make it clear that the United States "not only does not stop the war but is stepping it up. It hatched new military adventures and is plunging deeper into the war in Indochina." He also ridiculed the President's statement that American troops had ended their "offensive posture."

Thuy took issue with the President's statement that the United States had not given up on the negotiating track and was still pursuing negotiations, remarking caustically that "Nixon's negotiating pattern consists in seeking every means to force the South Vietnamese people to accept a lackey administration" and to demand a solution conforming to its stand. "Facts have shown," Thuy said, "that no threat can intimidate the Vietnamese people" and that if the Administration wants a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, it should "respond positively" to the PRG's seven points. The PRG delegate commented in a similar vein.

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## DRV ARTICLE CARRIES ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED PRC, USSR SUPPORT

Hanoi's misgivings about President Nixon's China trip were conveyed with unusual candor in an article recently available from the 12 November issue of the North Vietnamese weekly paper THONG NHAT (REUNIFICATION). The author, writing under the pseudonym "Me Giang," purported to be answering a letter from a friend in South Vietnam who had expressed anxiety about Western news reports of "Nixon's sensational diplomatic activities and their relationship with the Vietnam issue." Me Giang set out to assuage concern expressed by the "friend" that international support for Vietnam would lessen as a result of these activities. The friend also questioned, according to Me Giang, whether the President would be successful in "disengaging himself from Vietnam as he wants."

Hanoi media have never reported the President's plans to visit Peking and Moscow next year, and the Me Giang article accordingly failed to spell out the nature of the "activities" causing concern. It is not clear why the article was published at this time--more than two months after Hanoi halted its polemic against rapprochement with the United States--but its publication may be an indication of widely felt apprehension in the DRV over the President's projected trips.

Me Giang stressed at the outset that the "most critical period" of the war has "long passed" and that recent events must be judged against the background of the allegedly advantageous communist position. In this context, Me Giang reiterated that the PRG's 1 July seven-point proposal provided "an honorable way out" for the United States. He plainly indicated that efforts to press the PRG proposal were undermined by the moves in Sino-U.S. relations, but he saw this as a passing phenomenon: "Nixon's hectic moves at any rate could only temporarily ease the pressure of the public demand that the Americans accept the seven points." Me Giang maintained that "Nixon can neither ultimately reject the seven points . . . nor evade the two fundamental issues embodied in these seven points: the Americans must leave and the puppets must fall." Repeating an argument made in Hanoi's polemic against Peking in July and August, Me Giang asserted that "the Americans' hectic moves have been partially aimed at splitting the solidarity between our people and the fraternal socialist countries." He rejected this possibility, declaring that "reality" is at variance with President Nixon's hope to break socialist solidarity and citing

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as evidence the recent aid agreements signed by Hanoi with Peking and Moscow. He also specifically recalled statements of Chinese backing offered by Li Hsien-nien when he was in Hanoi in September to conclude the Sino-DRV aid agreement and affirmations of Soviet support in the joint statement issued at the end of President Podgornyy's 3-8 October visit. Me Giang observed: "Thus, I think it can be stressed that the political support of the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries for the Vietnam problem is thorough and clear."

Me Giang may well have been anticipating Pham Van Dong's trip to China and his enunciation of a hardened position on a settlement when he predicted, in a concluding sentence, "I am confident that soon other deeds on the military and diplomatic fronts will help you, brother, solve even more satisfactorily your questions about current events."

#### HANOI WARNS OF "NEW U.S. MILITARY ADVENTURES" AGAINST DRV

In the wake of Defense Secretary Laird's 3-6 November visit to Saigon and the heavy U.S. air strikes against Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces in North Vietnam on 7-8 November,\* Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to warn of "new military adventures" allegedly planned by the United States. In particular, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on 19 November, broadcast by Hanoi radio to South Vietnam, scored remarks by Secretary Laird at his 17 November press conference concerning use of U.S. planes against North Vietnam, Cambodia, or South Vietnam. It cited AP as reporting that Laird "also threatened that he would not hesitate to use the U.S. air force to support any new attacks" by the ARVN forces against Laos. The commentary said this statement "exposes the Nixon clique's dark scheme of preparing public opinion prior to embarking on new military adventures," and it cited recent U.S. air activities to buttress the charge that these have been increased. Accusing Laird of statements "constituting a very brazen and insolent challenge to socialist countries and progressive people throughout the world," the commentary went on to remind him of recent alleged defeats of the United States

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\* For a discussion of the Laird visit and the U.S. air strikes on 7-8 November, see the 10 November TRENDS, pages 20-21 and 17-19 respectively.

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and its allies and to assert that "no evil scheme, no cruel war act and no military strength can save the U.S. puppets from being totally defeated."

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 20th, urging combat-readiness and vigilance in the North, claimed that the United States and its allies have been "sustaining heavy blows and bitter defeats" and that with the onset of the dry season "they are fearfully trying to ward off the furious offensive blows that will rain on them." The paper warned that the United States, "with an extremely obdurate and warlike nature," is continuing the war and "carrying out military adventures in an attempt to save the dangerous situation on the battlefield" and to "calm" its Saigon allies. Pointing to recent U.S. strikes in North Vietnam as well as the dispatch of more U.S. aircraft carriers and ships to the area, the army paper pictured the President as "impudently threatening" at the 12 November press conference to continue air strikes in Indochina and Laird as "brazenly clamoring" on the 17th that he would use the air force to strike at North Vietnam. While declaring that "these words and extremely serious acts of war" of the Nixon Administration "can in no way intimidate our people," QUAN DOI NHAN DAN declared that "we must be constantly vigilant." It expressed the resolve of the northern armed forces and people "to be ready to strike back fiercely at all the U.S. war adventures no matter from where, when, and how they may come." A brief Hanoi radio report on the 17th touched on regional preparedness, noting that the population in Quang Binh Province has "adopted a wartime way of life in order to fight and defeat the enemy under all circumstances."

Some comment sees the "new military adventures" as resulting from failure of the Vietnamization policy. For example, a recorded statement by Tran Duc Tieu, member of the Thai Binh provincial party standing committee and political commissar of the Thai Binh military forces, broadcast in the domestic service on 16 November, said that the United States, faced with the "imminent failure" of Vietnamization, "has indulged in new and extremely serious military adventures." Hanoi radio on the 22d carried a statement by the commander of the Ha Tay provincial armed forces warning that the United States has "repeatedly bombed and strafed a number of areas in Vinh Linh, Quang Binh, Nghe An, and Lai Chau" and is "going to embark on new military adventures." The Ha Tay commander added that these actions "are very serious . . . frantic

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squirmings" resulting from the defeat of Vietnamization and a change in the balance of power on the battlefields. Both statements expressed resolve to heighten vigilance and combat-readiness to "smash all U.S. schemes and acts of war."

#### SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. STRIKES AT DRV, CLAIMS PLANE DOWNED

The two most recent DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements, on 20 and 22 November, condemned U.S. strikes at North Vietnam from 12 through 21 November. The protest on the 20th charged that from the 12th to the 19th, U.S. planes "attacked a number of populated areas in the western part of Quang Binh Province, causing losses in lives and property to the local population." It also claimed that during this period U.S. planes, including B-52's, "made repeated and savage raids against Huong Lap village in the demilitarized zone belonging to DRV territory."

The 22 November protest similarly alleged that U.S. strikes had caused casualties and damage to property and said that Huong Lap village continued to be the target of U.S. strikes on 20 and 21 November. In addition, it charged that on the 21st U.S. aircraft "hit a number of localities" in Nghe An Province,\* where one plane was downed by the Nghe An armed forces and people. A radio report earlier on the 22d said the plane was a A-7 and that its downing brought the total of U.S. planes downed over the DRV to 3,402.

#### COMMUNISTS ACCLAIM CAPTURE OF TOWN WEST OF PHNOM PENH

Cambodian and Vietnamese communist media have predictably hailed the "liberation" on 16 November of the town of Tuol Leap, 16 miles west of Phnom Penh. Hanoi's comment includes articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 21 November which also

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\* The U.S. command in Saigon announced that four A-7 planes struck an antiaircraft gun site near Vinh, a city in Nghe An, on the 21st after an unarmed reconnaissance plane had been fired on. Results of the strike were unknown, but there was reportedly no damage to the planes. In an earlier strike on the 21st, according to the U.S. command, American planes knocked out two antiaircraft positions 80 miles north of the DMZ. On the 16th the U.S. command had reported that U.S. planes attacked an antiaircraft battery 70 miles inside the DRV.

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praise the Cambodian National People's Liberation Armed Forces (CNPLAF) for successfully intercepting and turning back Cambodian Government forces attempting to retake the town. (The Phnom Penh Government has announced that it regained control of Tuol Leap on 20 November.) Both papers claim that the Tuol Leap engagement demonstrates the growth of the CNPLAF and maintain that Phnom Penh itself is now threatened.

The threat to Phnom Penh was raised in more dramatic terms in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 19th which stressed the proximity of Tuol Leap to the Cambodian capital and its Pochentong airfield and declared: "In capturing Tuol Leap, the CNPLAF is ready to thrust a sharp knife into the enemy's throat--the last lair of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh lackeys." The Front radio commentary alleged that Lon Nol has been forced to "scrape up troops from other regions to defend Phnom Penh" and to ask for Saigon troops to come to its aid. Ridiculing the notion that the ARVN can be of assistance, the commentary maintained that "the northwest defense line of Saigon" has also been cracked and that "if Thieu obeys his American boss and sends troops to Phnom Penh, he will be like a drowning man trying to save a drowning man."

A 22 November report by Sihanouk's news agency (AKI) sums up the results of the fighting in the Tuol Leap area: It claims that since fighting began at Tuol Leap on the 13th, the CNPLAF have put out of action four battalions and three companies and have inflicted heavy losses on another battalion.

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## USSR - INDIA - PAKISTAN

## SOVIET MEDIA PRESS INDIAN LINE ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Soviet media have dropped all vestiges of nonpartisanship in the tense Indian-Pakistani confrontation, while continuing to call for a political solution in East Bengal and the creation of secure conditions for the return home of the more than nine million Bengali refugees as a preliminary step toward defusing the situation. Having fixed the blame for the crisis with Pakistani President Yahya Khan,\* Moscow has continued to press hard on that point while contending that Yahya holds the key to--and bears the primary responsibility for--a political settlement of the East Pakistan situation and the prevention of Indian-Pakistani hostilities.

In keeping with this scenario, Moscow has portrayed India as the aggrieved party, desiring peace and engaging in purely defensive protective reactions to numerous and increasing Pakistani provocations. Where through October TASS was still using the technique of a single dispatch juxtaposing reports from New Delhi and Karachi trading charges of hostile military acts, TASS has been reporting only New Delhi's versions since 2 November. On 16 and 18 November, for example, TASS reported Indian official spokesmen as charging Pakistani provocations and border violations, with no counterbalancing references to Pakistani denials or countercharges. President Yahya Khan's proclamation of a state of national emergency was briefly reported by TASS on the 23d, but with no mention of his claim that the action was responsive to "the threat of external aggression."

EAST PAKISTAN      Obscuring the apparent outbreak of large-  
SITUATION          scale hostilities in East Pakistan on  
                     22 November, Soviet media have adopted  
New Delhi's line that Indian forces are not involved in what  
is pictured simply as a successfully developing offensive by

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\* See the TRENDS of 6 October, pages 26-30, for an examination of changes in Soviet treatment of the East Bengal situation immediately following Prime Minister Gandhi's 27-29 September state visit to the USSR. A followup article appears in the 28 October TRENDS.

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the Mukti Bahini "liberation forces" against the Pakistani army in East Pakistan. Soviet media did not report Radio Pakistan's charge on the 22d that India had launched an "all-out offensive against East Pakistan," but on the 23d TASS reported an Indian statement "categorically denying allegations spread by Pakistani sources that Indian troops had infiltrated into East Pakistan territory in the Jessore sector"; the statement noted, TASS said, that Indian troops had "a strict order not to cross the frontier." Also on the 23d, TASS carried an Indian report of "bitter fighting waged by guerrillas of the 'Mukti Bahini' insurgent army against the forces of the regular Pakistani army in various parts of East Pakistan," adding that the Mukti Bahini "is inflicting upon the regular army considerable losses in manpower and materiel."

Echoing Politburo member Grishin's comments in the October Revolution anniversary speech of 6 November, PRAVDA articles on the 9th and 23d and an IZVESTIYA article on the 16th pictured West Pakistani actions in East Pakistan as the focus of the current crisis. Grishin said that "mass repressions by the Pakistan authorities" led to the refugee flow into India; Kondrashov, in IZVESTIYA on the 16th, blamed the Bengali exodus on the initiation by "government troops" last spring of "cruel punitive operations against the peaceful Bengal population"; and Mezentsev similarly wrote in the 23 November PRAVDA that the "repressive actions by the military authorities in Rawalpindi" precipitated the tension in the subcontinent.

The articles all stressed that the situation is continuing to deteriorate because of West Pakistan's persistence in its repressive policies. Kondrashov impugned the veracity of Pakistan Government assertions that "active steps are being taken in Islamabad aimed at settling the situation in East Pakistan," calling such claims "at variance with the actual state of affairs." He commented that "the so-called general amnesty in fact proved extremely limited" and that "the attempt to create an outward semblance of a civilian administration in East Pakistan has failed." Mezentsev depicted the "much publicized amnesty" as a farce, reflected in the fact that "thousands of East Pakistanis continue to cross the border into India every day."

The Soviet commentators portray India, by contrast, as displaying "humanism" in shouldering the burden of concern for

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the fate of the millions of refugees, a burden which has forced India to divert resources from its own "progressive" socioeconomic reforms.

POLITICAL           Warning that the East Pakistan situation could  
SETTLEMENT       develop into military conflict between India and  
                  Pakistan, Moscow has reiterated the position that  
war will not solve East Pakistan's problems and that a political  
settlement must be achieved. The CPSU Central Committee  
resolution of 23 November calls for "achieving a peaceful  
settlement of the conflict on the Asian subcontinent," noting  
that the Soviet-Indian treaty is "of great importance for the  
consolidation of peace and international security."

Pakistan is portrayed as the provocateur on the border, and the onus is placed on Pakistan to take steps to settle the problem. Orestov in PRAVDA on the 19th charged "reactionary elements in Pakistan" with "decorating their cities with placards calling for crushing India and provoking daily clashes on the border"; and Kondrashov noted that "an anti-Indian campaign developed by chauvinist circles has recently been growing considerably more active in Pakistan," adding that "peculiar formations of a paramilitary nature are being created these days in certain political parties of Pakistan."

Like Grishin on the 6th, Soviet commentators urge a halt to the "repressions" of East Bengalis and the creation of secure conditions enabling the refugees to return home from India. Moscow has also repeatedly publicized Indian demands for the release of Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman and--as in a TASS report on the 18th--for "talks between the military regime in Islamabad and the elected leaders of East Bengal."

Sustaining Moscow's call for the Pakistani Government to implement a political settlement that would "take into account the will and the inalienable rights and legitimate interests of the people of East Pakistan," Soviet media have only once repeated the added proviso--in the 8 October Soviet-Algerian joint statement--that a settlement should preserve Pakistan's "national unity and territorial integrity." TASS on 10 November, reviewing NEW TIMES (No. 46), cited an article by A. Ulanskiy as pointing to "the persistent demands of the Soviet and all peaceloving people for urgent measures toward a political settlement in East Pakistan, with account of the will and interests of its population and based on the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state of Pakistan."

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Soviet media have not mentioned a need for "mutual" restraint since the 26 October Soviet-Canadian joint communique. But Moscow's reportage, in playing down the scope of present hostilities, has tended to suppress indications of what might appear to be a lack of restraint on India's part. Thus on the 22d TASS reported that four intruding Pakistani Air Force jets had been compelled by Indian planes to leave Indian airspace, but it failed to mention India's claim to have shot down three of the Pakistani aircraft.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW EXPLAINS VALUE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO ARABS

Moscow continues to praise Egypt's "constructive" stand and to portray the Arabs as seeking a peaceful solution to the Middle East problem. In line with this approach, Soviet media obscure the thrust of Egyptian President as-Sadat's 19 November speech in which he declared there is no hope for a peaceful solution and announced his "final decision--the battle." At the same time, Moscow underscores its own adherence to a political settlement and goes to some pains, in commentaries broadcast in the Arabic-language service, to explain this Soviet attitude which it says is not understood by all Arabs. And it pointedly recalls that Israel has exploited "irresponsible statements" made by "some Arab leaders."

The Arabic-language talks by Maksimov, broadcast on 22 and 23 November, justified the Soviet attitude toward a political settlement by saying that the USSR's position does not mean peace at any price, since a peaceful settlement must provide for Israeli withdrawal and will obstruct Israel's "expansionist policies." Stressing the importance of world public opinion in isolating Israel, Maksimov argued that there was a considerable change in Western public opinion when the attitude of some Arab countries to the settlement question was "clearly defined" after they officially agreed to a political settlement. Citing the example of anti-Arab tendencies in France just after the 1967 war, Maksimov recalled--in what might be construed as an admonition to as-Sadat--that no small part of this attitude was due to irresponsible statements by some Arab leaders which are exploited by "Zionist propaganda," which "naturally also resorted to direct falsification." Here he reminded his listeners that words were attributed to Nasir in a May 1967 press conference which he never uttered. But "in all fairness," Maksimov added, "there were Arab leaders who made extremist statements which helped the attack by Israeli propaganda on the Arabs."\* He maintained that the course toward a peaceful

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\* Moscow has occasionally in the past chided the Arabs for rash and irresponsible statements, as in a PRAVDA series by Belyayev and Primakov in August 1967. And in the summer of 1970, after Nasir accepted the U.S. initiative for a cease-fire, Moscow defended his action and criticized Arab "extremist sentiments" and opposition to Cairo's move.

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settlement in itself creates an international atmosphere unfavorable to Israeli policy, an atmosphere which the USSR takes into consideration "as it works for reaching a political solution."

Similarly, a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa on the 23d declared that the Soviet Union considers that a solution to the Middle East conflict "by peaceful means without the use of arms is possible and should be utilized." This stand of the Soviet Government, it said, is fully supported by the Soviet public. The commentary added that while the USSR is extending aid to the Arabs which has helped consolidate their "defense potential," at the same time it advocates a solution "through negotiations."

AS-SADAT SPEECH Giving minimal attention to as-Sadat's 19 November speech during his two-day tour of the front, Moscow obscures his rejection of "peaceful or other solutions" and his decision for "the battle." Thus Soviet media cited him as stressing that "in the absence of a political settlement," the Egyptian armed forces have no alternative but "to carry out their duty." TASS represented as-Sadat as saying that Egypt in the past eight months had exerted maximum efforts "for a political settlement"--evidently TASS' interpretation of his remark, as reported by Cairo radio on the 20th, that Egypt in that period had "made the utmost effort for the one percent hope our forces would cross the canal without an assault battle." TASS also noted that as-Sadat said he had informed the United States that there "is no room for discussion" until Israel answers Ambassador Jarring's 8 February memorandum and accepts complete withdrawal.

UNGA DEBATE Moscow anticipates criticism of the United States and "isolation" of Israel during the forthcoming debate on the Middle East but avoids predicting the outcome. A Ryzhikov commentary on the 17th concluded that it is difficult to foretell how the debate will end. A domestic service commentary by NOVOSTI observer Katin on the 22d said the discussion must promote a peaceful settlement, and the Radio Peace and Progress broadcast on the 23d pledged that the USSR would "employ its whole authority to advance the cause of peaceful settlement" in the debate. But Belyayev, in the 21 November domestic service commentators' roundtable, said only that the debate "should prove very interesting."

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Belyayev did bring up the possibility of sanctions against Israel, a subject touched on from time to time in 1969 but broached only infrequently since. One isolated mention, in an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article this June, maintained that there was every justification for considering the use of political and economic sanctions against Israel and recalled that Article 6 of the UN Charter provides for expulsion of members that persistently violate charter principles. Gromyko may have had these charter provisions in mind when he said, in his 28 September UNGA address, that the United Nations could contribute to a Middle East settlement provided it used "all its opportunities in accordance with the UN Charter."

Moscow's first known public allusion to PRC participation in the four-power talks on the Middle East came in a Paris-dated TASS dispatch on the 19th decrying "anti-Soviet fabrications" by Israeli Government circles. Citing AFP, TASS said the Israeli paper MAARIV alleged that the United States had informed Israel "that the United States reached agreement with the Soviet Union not to admit" the PRC to the Big Four talks. TASS typically avoided outright denial, merely adding that the purpose of the "newly invented fraud" is aimed at frustrating efforts for a political settlement.

ARMS ISSUE      Propagandists take note of Israel's insistence on renewed Phantom deliveries, reporting Premier Golda Meir as saying the purpose of her forthcoming visit to the United States is to obtain another large shipment of the planes. Koryavin in the 19 November IZVESTIYA claimed that Israel's "Phantomania" shows that Tel Aviv's aim is not to solve the crisis but to obtain still more armaments. And Belyayev, in the panelists' roundtable, declared that there is "no need at the moment" to provide Israel with any additional military aid; there is no need, he added, for further proof that the United States has equipped Israel's armed forces with Phantoms and other up-to-date offensive military equipment. Moscow also picks up reports--emanating from an 11 November speech by Senator Dole--on a recent U.S.-Israeli agreement on the production in Israel of armaments and other equipment. A Rassadin commentary on the 18th claimed this agreement coincided with stepped-up military preparations by Israel, which hoped by aggravating the situation to destroy the Arabs' diplomatic initiative to achieve a speedy settlement, and to perpetuate its occupation of Arab territories.

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In the only available Soviet reference to reports of new deliveries of TU-16 Badger planes to Egypt, TASS on the 20th cited the Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH as saying that to justify its efforts to build up Israel's military potential, the United States is spreading "rumors that a new batch of Soviet aircraft was allegedly delivered to Egypt."

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## CHINA

### RED FLAG NO. 12 ARTICLE CONDEMNS SECTARIANISM IN PARTY

An article in the 12th issue of RED FLAG (released 2 November) written by the writing group of the Kiangsu CCP Committee has given new momentum to the developing propaganda attack against unidentified leadership cliques that have allegedly sought to split the party. Under the pretext of discussing the party's "work style," the article assails current indications of "sectarianism" in the party and demands that those "renegades" guilty of a "criminal conspiracy to split and corrupt the party" be completely exposed and "knocked down."

The "renegades" are said to be "very few" in number, and the limited nature of the current purge is further indicated by passages that draw a distinction between those consciously guilty and those temporarily misled. "The sectarian tendency manifested by a few comrades in our party is different in essence from the sectarian splitting activities carried out by ambitionists and schemers who sneaked into our party." The former, comrades still, are required only to undergo "rectification" and to "learn from past mistakes."

The RED FLAG article suggests publicly for the first time that cadres have been given some explanation of the recent purge of Lin Biao and several other top military leaders. After reviewing several historical examples of those who "engaged in sectarian activities" and attempted to split the party, the article stated that these anti-party activities, including those carried out by Liu Shao-chi and "other political swindlers," have "already been laid before the party and the people."

Other propaganda items, following on reports of discord between PLA and party cadres, indicate a continued effort to readjust the division of power between the party, the PLA and the revolutionary committees. Judging by a Kweiyang press article on 14 November, for example, the PLA's dominant role in civil affairs, a carryover of tasks entrusted to the army during the cultural revolution, may be giving way to the revived authority of civilian party members.

The Kweiyang article, written by the "support-the-left" office of the PLA units stationed in Tsunyi municipality (site of the 1935 conference which placed Mao in control of the party), discussed the need to strengthen the concept of the party and uphold the

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party's unified leadership. The article stated that, prior to creation of the new municipal party committee, "certain local cadres were not bold enough in their work" and "the cadres and masses looked to us to solve all problems, big and small." PLA representatives complained that local civilian cadres "always let us make our attitude known first," which "hindered the unified leadership of the party." In order to correct this situation and also to strengthen their concept of the party, the PLA representatives "handed over to the municipal CCP committee for study and discussion all major problems of the 'three supports and two militaries' work." Complying with the "party's organizational principles" and the need to "uphold the prestige of the CCP committee," all "support-the-left" personnel then followed the decisions made by the municipal CCP committee.

At the same time, however, it was clearly stated in the Kweiyang article that the PLA must not completely withdraw from its administrative duties. PLA members were warned that "retreating to the second line means retreating from the frontline of the 'three supports and two militaries' work"--which would "depart from Chairman Mao's line on army-building."

A parallel effort appears underway to reassert party authority over revolutionary committees. In a 16 November report on the relationship between the party committee and the revolutionary committee in a local Chengtu factory, the Szechwan provincial radio declared that in matters regarding party principles and major questions of revolution and production, "the party committee makes a decision first, and the revolutionary committee then makes specific arrangements for implementing it." Party decisions are to be submitted for discussion to the revolutionary committee, but all amendments must be approved by the party committee before they are carried out. Enlarged party committee meetings, held "in the light of the tasks assigned by the central authorities," allow members of the revolutionary committee a chance to participate as "observers to discuss the problem" and then "implement whatever decisions are reached."

#### SECOND-LEVEL LEADERSHIP RANKINGS SHOW SOME SHIFTS

Led by Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching, and Yeh Chien-ying, the nine currently active Politburo members who appeared together at the Albanian rally on 8 November have made further appearances as a

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group in connection with the current visit to Peking of North Vietnam's party-government delegation. Mao himself made one of his rare appearances on the 22d to receive the delegation in the company of Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien.

Peking's listing of the leaders present at the airport to welcome the North Vietnamese delegation seemed to indicate a measure of uncertainty regarding the placement of those leaders who are just below the top level. Recent shifts in rank, over the past two weeks, seem likely.

The initial report of the airport arrival was broadcast by Peking domestic radio at 1200 GMT 20 November. Following the list of Politburo members present, plus Kuo Mo-jo, the broadcast named International Liaison Department head Keng Piao, Peking municipal deputy chief Wu Te, and acting foreign minister Chi Peng-fei as leaders present. NCNA accounts of the arrival, starting with an NCNA English account at 1503 GMT on the same day, inserted the name of Hunan first secretary Hua Kuo-feng after Kuo Mo-jo, placed Wu above Keng, and added PLA deputy chief of staff Chang Tsai-chien. (When Hua Kuo-feng first appeared in Peking, seeing off the UN delegation on 9 November with "members of various departments," his name followed that of Keng Piao. Also, in that listing Chang was ranked after navy commander Hsiao Ching-kuang in the list of PLA personnel present.)

The Hanoi account of the arrival offers yet another order for the Chinese leaders; if it was based on a list earlier supplied by the Chinese, it indicates further last-minute changes. Hanoi listed Kuo Mo-jo followed by Keng Piao, Hsiao Ching-kuang, vice-minister of foreign trade Li Chiang, and Wu Te; Keng and Chang were not listed. The placement of Li seems an obvious mistake, but traditionally Hanoi has been well enough informed to follow Peking's order of ranking.

An NCNA account released at 2242 GMT on the 20th of an evening meeting between the delegations was in accord with the earlier NCNA rankings. After Kuo, the "leading members of departments concerned" were Hua, Wu, Keng, Chi, and Chang.

Hua's sudden rise may indicate that he has taken over a department of the Central Committee, but his known background offers few clues. His career before the mid-50's is not known; at that time he became a Hunan vice-governor and later a party secretary. He rose to the top position in Hunan last year after Li Yuan was either purged or transferred.

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Chang Tsai-chien is the junior vice-chief of staff, first identified in the post at the end of June this year; he began appearing regularly in Peking in May. He served previously as a deputy commander of the Nanking military region under Politburo member Hsu Shih-yu, who has not appeared since June.

There may be other casualties among the active deputy chiefs in addition to those who disappeared with Huang Yung-sheng in early September. Chen Chi-te and Yen Chung-chuan have not appeared since the end of September. Yen last appeared on his return from Hanoi with Li Hsien-nien, and his role as a member of that delegation makes his failure to appear for Pham Van Dong's arrival noteworthy. Two other deputy chiefs, Peng Shao-hui and Wang Hsin-ting, have appeared in November.

#### INNER MONGOLIA GIVES FIRST POPULATION FIGURE SINCE SPLIT-UP

An INNER MONGOLIA DAILY editorial of 19 November, broadcast by Huhehot radio the same day, placed the region's population at "seven million people of all nationalities." Before parts of the region were divided among its neighbors two and one-half years ago, Inner Mongolian media claimed a population of 13 million.

In the summer of 1969, in what appeared to be an effort to consolidate border lines of communication against the Soviet threat, the neighboring provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning took over, respectively, the mongs of Hulunpeierh, Chelimu and Chaowuta. To the west, part of Payennaoerh meng was split off and given to Kansu. In August 1969 the population figure cited for Heilungkiang went up by two million; the other provinces that gained territory have never advanced any new population totals.

Inner Mongolia's borders now seem to be stable, with no further changes. Since the Huhehot radio resumed local broadcasting on 3 November, it has frequently made reference to the mongs it still controls, including Payennaoerh, but not to any of the areas it lost in 1969.

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## SINO - SOVIET RELATIONS

### MOSCOW USES ALLIES TO WARN AGAINST PEKING'S AIMS IN UN

Moscow has reacted with restraint in its own name to the PRC policy statement delivered in the UN General Assembly on 15 November by Peking's delegation head Chiao Kuan-hua. The Soviet central press has ignored the statement, but Moscow broadcasts to China--chiefly over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress--as well as comment emanating from the USSR's close allies in Eastern Europe register concern over the prospect that Peking may use the United Nations as a forum for Sino-American "collusion" and for harsher attacks on Soviet foreign policy.

A Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 19th aired an article in the Czechoslovak party organ RUDE PRAVO which took Chiao to task for his anti-Soviet statements, particularly for putting the "reactionary" United States in the same category as the Soviet Union. The broadcast quoted the Czech daily as remarking that the United States took "an indifferent attitude" toward the Chinese delegate's criticism of the U.S. policies because Washington believed it was "offset by his attacks against the Soviet Union." Purporting to provide "the inside story" of present Sino-American contacts, the paper was quoted as saying "the United States is trying to make use of the anti-Soviet trend of the policy of the present Chinese leadership." The broadcast also cited RUDE PRAVO's remark that "U.S. ideologists" hope "the Chinese leaders will open their second battlefront in the United Nations and launch a struggle against the Soviet Union."

In its own name, Radio Peace and Progress told listeners in China on the 20th that Chiao's UNGA speech was an indication "that Chinese diplomacy is aimed at using the UN podium for propagating Peking's antisocialist foreign policy." The broadcast objected in particular to Chiao's criticism of the USSR's Middle East policy and his more general "slander that the Soviet Union is using the United Nations for attaining stealthy ends."

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In an apparent effort to put those who would consort with the Chinese at the United Nations on their guard, Sofia's military daily NARODNA ARMIYA--which has frequently served as a vehicle for anti-China polemics--warned of Peking's troublemaking potential in the world forum. Entitled "Are There Reasons for Alarm?", the 18 November article by Col. Gancho Ranchev cited as evidence of possible things to come the "anti-Soviet" statements that accompanied Peking's entry into the United Nations. Noting that the PRC's official statement condemned the "two superpowers," the Bulgarian commentator said "there is no doubt that by mentioning a second country in their declaration, they mean the USSR." In an elaborate portrayal of the PRC as a danger to world peace, Ranchev assailed Mao's doctrine on revolution, "which is inevitably linked with war." It is obvious, he concluded, that such views "cause real alarm among the public."

Another article in NARODNA ARMIYA on the 20th, written "especially for the paper" by PRAVDA's political commentator Korionov, did not mention the Chinese UNGA statement but pressed the attack on the Peking leadership's "splitting" tactics and its rapprochement with the United States. Korionov observed that in the light of "the current flirtation between Peking and Washington," it becomes particularly clear why the Chinese leadership firmly rejected the proposals of the CPSU and other parties which called for united support for the DRV. Even in those years, he added, "people in Peking worked on plans to establish contacts with U.S. imperialism."

#### TASS LINKS PRC'S INTERNAL "GRAVE CRISIS" TO MAOIST POLICIES

Moscow has continued to react cautiously to developments in China but has sought to convey the idea that the present crisis can be traced to high-level dissension over Maoist foreign policy and, by implication, its anti-Soviet line and rapprochement with the United States. A TASS report on recent Chinese internal developments, published in the central press on the 20th, concluded that "there is a grave crisis in the Chinese leadership." Citing foreign reports based on Peking sources, TASS said that Lin Biao is being denounced and that he and some of his followers have disappeared; it also noted that provincial purges are underway. Although acknowledging that there is no consensus among observers in Peking on the reasons for the crisis, TASS said pointedly: "Most agree that the strife in

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the Peking leadership is a manifestation of the general crisis of the Maoist political line [and is] new evidence of grave and deep differences between Chinese leaders on major problems of domestic and foreign policy."

Where TASS did not elaborate on the "major problems" allegedly in dispute within the Chinese leadership, Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in a broadcast to China on the 17th cited a UPI report that "diplomatic sources are saying the recent events in China are the result of a disagreement over the treatment of the United States and Russia." UPI quoted diplomats, the radio added, as saying that "a small group of people capable of decisive action and occupying secure positions in the CCP and army have resolved to bring about a reconciliation between Peking and Moscow." Other Soviet media have not used the UPI report.

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## PRC NUCLEAR TEST

### PEKING ANNOUNCES DETONATION IN UNUSUALLY BRIEF COMMUNIQUE

In a statement on the 19th, NCNA announced that the PRC the preceding day had conducted another of the "necessary and limited nuclear tests . . . for the purpose of defense." By far the briefest and most modest of the statements on any of the PRC's 10 announced tests,\* the statement said only that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons and repledged the Chinese Government and people to a continuing struggle for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

The announcement did not mention the long-standing PRC proposal for a world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. While the proposal had appeared in the announcements only of the first three tests, it has been broached in elite propaganda over the past year--most recently in UN delegate Chiao Kuan-Hua's 15 November speech before the General Assembly. Also absent from the latest announcement are the customary obeisance to Mao's thought, the declaration that the Chinese tests encourage those struggling for independence, and the observation that such tests are a blow to the nuclear monopoly of "U.S. imperialism and social imperialism."

To date Peking media have carried no followup comment or reports of nationwide celebrations. Central press editorial comment had accompanied the announcement of the first test in October 1964 and hailed two subsequent ones that marked major advances in weaponry--the test of a nuclear missile in October 1966 and of a hydrogen bomb in June 1967. Publicity for jubilant celebrations in China and for alleged worldwide acclaim followed the release of the announcements of the first seven tests, but not the 4 October 1969 announcement of tests eight and nine (on 23 and 29 September, respectively).

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\* Two tests detected by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission have gone unannounced by Peking--those of 24 December 1967 and 14 October 1970.

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COMMUNIST REACTIONS Moscow departed from its normal practice of waiting for Peking's announcement and then carrying a brief report citing NCNA. This time TASS reported nearly seven hours before the NCNA announcement that the PRC had carried out an atmospheric test in Sinkiang. TASS went on to report that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had issued an official statement expressing regret over the test and that the Japanese Government was watching for "possible fallout." The item was repeated in a Mandarin-language broadcast on the 20th, which noted that it had been carried in the Soviet press. Also on the 20th, Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin expressed "understanding" of the Japanese people's concern over the test and quoted the General Secretary of the World Peace Council as saying the test was "by no means a more humane act" than the "arrogant" 6 November U.S. test on Amchitka in the Aleutians.

The only comment available so far from Moscow's East European allies appeared in Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 19th. The paper noted that the test was the 12th carried out by the Chinese. It pointed out that the test took place three days after Chiao Kuan-Hua in the General Assembly had declared that the PRC would not take part in the Soviet-proposed conference of the five nuclear powers. And it concluded that the world public will undoubtedly "take a critical attitude" toward the Chinese experiment.

The test has drawn predictable accolades from Albania, with an article in ZERI I POPULLIT on the 22d calling the detonation another step toward breaking the "imperialist-revisionist nuclear monopoly." Pyongyang's KCNA on the 22d carried the text of Kim Il-song's congratulatory message of the 20th, addressed to Mao and Chou En-lai; Kim had also sent a message on the September 1969 experiments, his first such message since the May 1966 test. While the customary congratulatory message from the DRV leaders has not been reported, Premier Pham Van Dong, in speeches in Peking on the 20th and 23d carried in full by NCNA, hailed the latest test and noted the PRC's rapid advance in the nuclear and space fields. In the latter address, he went on to state that the tests have strengthened the PRC's defense capabilities.

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